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LAGRAND AND A VENA ESTABLISH A RIGHT, BUT 
IS THERE A REMEDY? BRIEF COMMENTS ON 
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF LAGRAND AND 
A VENA IN THE U.S. 
By Malvina Halberstam• 
The United States is obligated under international law to review and 
reconsider the conviction and sentence of persons who were not informed of 
their right to request that their Consul be notified of their arrest and to meet with 
him, as provided for by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations. 1 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) so ruled in Avena2 and LaGraruf. 
The ICJ had jurisdiction under the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention. 4 
Unlike the ICJ decision in the Nicaragua case5 and the recent ICJ advisory 
opinion on the Israeli security fence, 6 both of which raise serious questions 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. The author served 
as Counselor on International Law in the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor. The author 
wishes to thank Cheryl Fuchs, Cardozo '05, and Philip Segal, Cardozo '06, for their assistance with the 
research for this article. These comments were presented at International Law Weekend 2004, panel on The 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations After Avena, held in New York City, October 15, 2004. Professor 
Valerie Epps, who organized and moderated the panel, summarized the decisions in Breard, LaGrand, and 
Avena, in her introductory remarks. The comments that follow assume familiarity with these decisions. 
I. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, para. l(b), (c), 596 U.N.T.S. 
261,292 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (entered into force Mar. 19, 1967). 
2. Case Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.CJ. l (March 31). 
3. LaGrand Case (Germany v. U.S.), 20011.CJ. 466 (June 27). 
4. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory 
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1964, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 326,500 U.N.T.S. 241,242 [hereinafter Optional 
Protocol]. ("Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court 
by an application made by any Party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol."). 
5. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
U.S.), 1984 I.CJ. 392 (Nov. 26). 
6. Legal Consequences of the Construction ofa Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 
I.CJ. - 43 I.L.M. 1009 (July 9) [hereinafter Legal Consequences] . 
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about the propriety of the Court's assertion of jurisdiction, 7 there was no serious 
question of the Court's jurisdiction in this case. 
The United States conceded, with respect to most of the defendants, that 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention had not been complied with. 8 The remedy 
determined by the Court is not unreasonable. It does not require reversal and 
retrial. It only requires ''the United States of America to provide, by means of 
its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences."9 
The ICJ ruling is binding on U.S. courts, state and federal. Article VI of 
the U.S. Constitution provides: 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary 
notwithstanding. 10 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, establishing the right of an 
arrested foreign national to be informed, and the Optional Protocol, giving the 
7. Although it was undisputed that Nicaragua had never accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the !CJ, the Court ruled that it had jurisdiction under article 36(5) of the !CJ Statute, which provides: 
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties 
to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance 
with their terms. 
Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 169, 200, 204(May 10). 
The problem was that there was no record of Nicaragua ever having accepted the jurisdiction of the 
PCU either. Id. at 20 I. Nicaragua had indicated in 1939 that it would send its "instrument of ratification" 
accepting jurisdiction of the PCIJ. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J . 392,400 (Nov. 26). The !CJ acknowledged in its opinion that the "files 
of the League ofNations however contain no record ofan instrument of ratification ever having been received. 
No evidence has been adduced before the Court to show that such an instrument of ratification was ever 
dispatched to Geneva." 
In the case involving the wall, the Court improperly used its advisory jurisdiction to rule on a 
contentious matter without the consent of one of the parties. A number of states, including the United States 
and the European Union, urged the Court not to exercise jurisdiction. Id. For an excellent discussion of the 
ICJ's exercise of the advisory function in this case, see Michla Pomerance, The Advisory Function and the 
Crumbling Wall Between the Political and the Judicial, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 26 (2005). 
8. See supra note 2. In Avena the U.S. challenged Mexico's suit on jurisdictional and procedural 
grounds, but did not contest Mexico's claim that it had failed to inform the defendants of their rights under 
article 36 of the Vienna Convention in most of the 52 cases. 
9. Id at 55. 
10. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added). 
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ICJ jurisdiction to interpret that right, are treaties of the United States. 11 There 
is no dispute about the self-executing nature of these treaties. While I and a 
number of other commentators have argued that non-self-executing declarations 
violate article VI, 12 that question does not arise here. The United States 
acknowledged at the time of ratification that the treaty is "entirely self-
executing. " 13 
It has been argued that ''the ICJ does not exercise any judicial power in the 
United States, which is vested exclusively by the Constitution in the United 
States federal courts."14 That is indisputable. But, as Justice Breyer points out 
in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Torres, "it fails to address the 
question whether the ICJ has been granted the authority, by means of treaties to 
which the U.S. is a party, to interpret the rights conferred by the Vienna 
Convention."15 The answer is yes; the Optional Protocol gives the ICJ that 
authority. 16 The ICJ judgment is binding in the United States not because the 
ICJ has judicial authority in the United States, but because the Vienna 
Convention as interpreted by the ICJ is binding on the United States under 
article VI of the U.S. Constitution. 
The problem is implementing the ICJ ruling. If the state has a procedure 
under which it provides review, there is, of course, no problem. Oklahoma did 
so in the Torres case. 17 If the state does not have a procedure that can be 
invoked by the defendant, it has an obligation to create one. That is so, because 
article VI of the Constitution requires state judges to implement the treaty 
obligations of the United States, and the Vienna Convention, as authoritatively 
interpreted by the ICJ, requires the United States to provide review. Ideally, 
states whose laws bar judicial review in these cases will change their laws. 
Nevertheless, if a state fails to establish a procedure for review, 
considerations of federalism would probably preclude the federal government 
11. Vienna Convention, supra note 1, at 292; Optional Protocol, supra note 4, at 326. The Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol entered into force for the United States on April 24, 
1963. Id 
12. Malvina Halberstam, Alvarez-Machain II: The Supreme Court's Reliance on the Non-Self-
Executing Declaration in the Senate Resolution Giving Advice and Consent to the International Covenant on 
Civil & Political Rights, l Journal of National Security Law & Policy 89 (2005);United States Ratification 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 31 GEO. W ASH. J. INT' L 
L. & ECON. 49, 64-69 ( 1997) ( quoting a number of commentators). 
13. Torres v. Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1039 (2003)(Breyer, J., dissenting)(quotingJ. Edward Lyerly, 
State Dep't Deputy Legal Advisor, Testimony at Senate Hearing on the Ratification of the Vienna Convention 
(Mar. 19, 1967)). 
14. Torres, 540 U.S. at 1041. 
15. Id. 
16. See Optional Protocol, supra note 4. 
17. Torres v. Oklahoma, 58 P.3d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004). 
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from compelling states to provide a remedy. 18 The alternative is for the federal 
government to provide review. The difficulty, of course, is that in recent years 
Congress and the Supreme Court have greatly narrowed the scope of federal 
habeas corpus. 19 Nevertheless, some federal courts have held that federal courts 
may review such cases under §2254,20 notwithstanding the failure to raise the 
claim as required by state law. For example, in the Made} case the federal 
district court took the position that a state's procedural default rules would not 
bar federal review.21 It distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Breard,22 
saying, 
The Supreme Court's declaration in Breard that the procedural default 
rules apply equally to Vienna Convention violations operated on the explicit 
assumption that "those rules enable full effect to be given to the purposes for 
which the rights accorded under this Article are intended." The I.C.J. has now 
declared that those rules do interfere with giving full effect to the purposes of 
the treaty, undermining a major premise of the holding.23 
But other federal courts have held that such an action would be foreclosed. 
The Fifth Circuit has so held in the Medellin case, which involves one of the 
petitioners in the Avena case.24 A petition for certiorari has been filed in that 
case.25 If the Supreme Court interprets §2254 to permit judicial review in all the 
18. See, e.g. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 
(1997). But see Torres v. Mullin, 124 S.Ct. 919,920 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added) 
Article VI, cl. 2, of our Constitution provides that the "Laws of the United States," 
expressly including "all Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall 
be the supreme Law of the Land." The Court was unfaithful to that command when it 
held that Congress may not require county employees to check the background of 
prospective handgun purchasers, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 
138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), that Congress may not exercise its Article I powers to 
abrogate a State's common-law immunity from suit, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44, I 16 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (19%), and that a State may not be 
required to provide its citizens with a remedy for its violation of their federal rights, 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, I 19 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). The Court is 
equally unfaithful to that command when it permits state courts to disregard the 
Nation's treaty obligations. 
19. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of I 9%, Pub. L. No. I 04-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.S. § 2244 (2004)); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). 
20. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (19%). 
21. United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 223 F. Supp. 2d %8 (N.D.lll. 2002). 
22. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
23. Made}, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 979. 
24. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004). 
25. A petition for certiorari was filed on Aug. I 8, 2004. Petition for Certiorari at i, 2004 WL 
2851246, Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. (Tex.) May 20,2004) (No. 04-5928). The questions 
presented in the petition are the following: 
I. In a case brought by a Mexican national whose rights were adjudicated in the 
[International Court of Justice's] Avena Judgment, must a court in the United 
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cases required by the Vienna Convention as interpreted by the ICJ, that will 
resolve the remedy problem. But, if the Supreme Court interprets §2254 more 
narrowly, there will still be cases for which the United States is required to 
provide review under the Vienna Convention but cannot do so under existing 
U.S. law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
A state's domestic law is, of course, not a defense to non-compliance with 
its international obligations.26 The solution, in my view, would be an 
amendment to §2254, giving federal district courts jurisdiction in those cases 
where the United States is obligated to provide review under a treaty and no 
state forum is available. Such an amendment would not impose a great burden 
on the federal courts, as the number of cases is not very large (and hopefully 
will be fewer as state officials become more knowledgeable about the Vienna 
Convention requirements). Such an amendment would probably also be good 
for the United States politically. At a time when the United States is being 
criticized for not adhering to various treaties-which under international law it, 
of course, has every right not to ratify-it would demonstrate that the United 
States takes its international obligations seriously and respects those treaties that 
it has ratified. 
States apply as the rule of decision, notwithstanding any inconsistent United 
States precedent, the Avena holding that the United States courts must review 
and reconsider the national's conviction and sentence, without resort to 
procedural default doctrines? 
2. In a case brought by a foreign national of a State party to the Vienna 
Convention, should a court in the United States give effect to the [International 
Court of Justice's] LaGrand and Avena judgments as a matter of international 
judicial comity and in the interest of uniform treaty interpretation? 
Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 10, 2004. Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004). 
It dismissed the petition as improvidently granted on May 23, 2005 in a per curiam opinion, 544 U.S. -
(2005). 
26. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 , 
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) ("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform a treaty"). The U.S. has not ratified the Convention, but accepts it as generally 
reflecting customary international law. 
